12 months of debate. 1 referendum. Written into the Constitution.
Voting once every five years — is that really deciding?
Between two elections, citizens have no way to propose, to correct, or to block. Distrust grows, abstention with it, and the feeling that “it's all decided in advance” sets in. The PACTE answers exactly that: twelve reforms of the rules of the game, debated one by one, then settled by the people.
“A democracy where the people can never trigger a vote is not yet quite a democracy.”
In concrete terms: as soon as enough citizens request it (by signature), a national referendum is held — to propose a law, repeal one, recall an elected official, or amend the Constitution. The result is binding on those in power.
What threshold should trigger a citizens' initiative referendum (RIC) — not too easy, not too hard? The commitment is fixed: no restriction on subject or scope (laws, officials, treaties, the Constitution). The real dial to set is how easy it is to trigger: accessible enough to be genuinely useful, demanding enough to stay serious.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Triggering is fairly easy: a moderate number of signatures is enough to launch a referendum — for example 1% of registered voters, roughly 500,000 people.
For
- A direct democracy that is alive and well in everyday life.
- The people use it for real, not just on paper.
- A tool within reach of citizens and grassroots groups.
Against
- Risk of referendums coming too often.
- Instability: the rules could change constantly.
- Voter fatigue from being called to the polls so often.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Triggering is rare: it takes a lot of signatures — for example 5% of registered voters, roughly 2.4 million people — so the RIC is reserved for the big questions.
For
- The people are only called on for what matters most.
- Stability: few votes, lasting rules.
- Each referendum keeps real weight.
Against
- Could make the RIC nearly unusable.
- Becomes a de facto lock rather than a real right.
- Issues with less media attention would never reach the threshold.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Several parameters are combined: a signature threshold, a collection deadline, and a turnout quorum for the vote.
For
- Balance: accessible yet serious.
- Built-in safeguards against abuse.
- Each tier can be fine-tuned.
Against
- Harder to explain.
- Several parameters to set at once.
- A poorly set quorum can block the outcome.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
The threshold starts high, then is lowered in steps after a few years of practice (for example 2% at first, 1% after five years).
For
- The country gets comfortable with the tool gradually.
- Reassures those who fear overuse.
- The ramp-down schedule is known in advance.
Against
- The RIC is hard to use at first.
- Two successive rules to explain.
- The steps themselves still have to be decided.
In concrete terms: no constitutional amendment without a citizens' vote. How far to close the Congress route (where Parliament amends the Constitution among itself) — for every amendment, or only for the democratic ground rules — is exactly what the debate, and then the referendum, will decide.
The Constitution belongs to the people. The fixed point: no more amendments without the citizens' vote (the Congress route, where Parliament alone decides, is gone). Two questions remain to settle, independent of each other. Tick one option per question, open "Open to debate" for the case for and against.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Elected officials keep the power to propose an amendment, but the people always decide, by referendum. The Congress route (amendment by Parliament alone) is removed.
For
- No more amendments decided without the citizens' vote.
- The final word always belongs to the people.
- A simple rule: one amendment, one referendum.
Against
- The initiative stays in the hands of officials.
- Citizens cannot launch an amendment themselves.
- Can slow down consensual technical adjustments.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
A referendum becomes mandatory for everything touching the democratic ground rules (voting method, term limits, freedoms). For the rest, the Congress route stays available.
For
- Protects the essentials without weighing everything down.
- Keeps flexibility for technical amendments.
- Clearly marks what belongs to the people.
Against
- The "ground rules" / "the rest" line is to be defined.
- Leaves an area to Parliament alone.
- Risk of disputes over the scope.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Every amendment goes to a referendum, and citizens can also trigger one themselves: a citizens' initiative that bears on the Constitution.
For
- The people can propose AND decide.
- The most direct democracy.
- Consistent with the spirit of the RIC.
Against
- Risk of too-frequent amendments to the founding text.
- Requires a solid framework to stay serious.
- The stability of the Constitution must be watched.
In every case, an amendment first needs a majority of the votes (the "yes" wins). The question here: should a participation condition be required on top of that, to reassure those who fear that a small number could decide for everyone?
Open to debate the case for and against ›
An amendment is validated only if at least 75% of registered voters have voted, on top of a majority of yes votes.
For
- An amendment cannot pass on low turnout.
- Requires a genuine mobilisation of the country.
- Strengthens the legitimacy of the change.
Against
- Such a rate is rarely reached (risk of blocking everything).
- Rewards the boycott: opponents win by staying home.
- Can freeze the Constitution for a long time.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
The "yes" is counted against all registered voters, not just those who voted: it must gather at least 50%.
For
- Requires broad support, not a chance majority.
- Does not reward the boycott: abstaining means not supporting.
- Fairer than a turnout quorum.
Against
- A high bar to clear.
- A supported but low-mobilising reform can fail.
- A less intuitive notion to explain.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
As today: the majority of those who vote wins, with no turnout threshold.
For
- Simple and clear.
- No premium on abstention.
- Respects the vote of those who turn out.
Against
- Does not ease the fear of a small number deciding.
- Low turnout can be enough.
- Legitimacy sometimes contested.
In concrete terms: replace the two-round, single-member voting system with a method that lets people express a genuine choice — where you can back your true favorite without fearing you'll “waste” your vote, and without being reduced to voting against someone. Several methods make this possible; which one to adopt is exactly what must be decided together.
Which voting method should we adopt? No option is imposed here. These are the main known methods: each one fixes “tactical voting” in its own way, with its own strengths and limits. The idea is to debate them and decide together, through public debate and then the referendum.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Each voter ticks one single candidate. The one with the most votes wins, even without an absolute majority. It is the most widespread system, and the most disputed.
For
- Very simple to understand and to count.
- An immediate result: one ballot, one cross.
- Familiar to everyone.
Against
- Pushes toward tactical voting and voting against.
- A candidate can win with a small minority.
- Crushes long-shot candidates by default.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
If no one has an absolute majority in the first round, the top two face off in a second. It is the current system for the French presidential election.
For
- The winner ends up with a majority in the runoff.
- Well known and tested in France.
- Leaves a second chance to transfer support.
Against
- Tactical voting in the first round is still strong.
- Can eliminate in round one a candidate who beat everyone head-to-head.
- Two trips to the polls.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Voters rank the candidates. The last-place candidate is eliminated and their votes are transferred to the next choice, round after round, until someone has a majority.
For
- No more tactical voting: you can rank your favorite 1st without risk.
- Battle-tested (Australia, Ireland) and fairly intuitive.
- The winner ends up with a majority after transfers.
Against
- The round-by-round count is longer to explain.
- Can, in rare cases, eliminate a candidate who would have beaten everyone head-to-head (unlike Condorcet).
- The elimination order can produce unintuitive results.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
The voter ranks the candidates. Each rank earns points (with 5 candidates: 4 points for 1st, 3 for 2nd… 0 for last). The candidate with the most points wins.
For
- Very simple to count: just add up points.
- Favors broadly accepted candidates over divisive ones.
- Long track record (national elections in Nauru, prizes, committees).
Against
- Open to manipulation: deliberately ranking your main rival last skews the score.
- The points scale is arbitrary.
- Can elect a “lukewarm” candidate who is nobody’s first choice.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
The voter gives each candidate a score (for example 0 to 5), independently of the others. The candidate with the best average (or highest total) wins.
For
- Expresses the intensity of support, nuance by nuance.
- Intuitive ballot: everyone knows how to grade.
- You can score several candidates highly without hurting any of them.
Against
- Encourages extreme scoring (0 or 5) to carry more weight.
- An average is easier to manipulate than a median.
- What “3 out of 5” means varies from voter to voter.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Voters check every candidate they approve of (as many as they like). The winner is the candidate with the most approvals.
For
- Very simple: a ballot with checkboxes, nothing to rank or grade.
- Favors the most broadly acceptable candidates; you are never penalized for approving your favorite.
- Easy counting (simple addition).
Against
- Says nothing about intensity or order: “I love them” and “I can live with them” count the same.
- Invites strategizing: how far should you extend your approvals?
- Can favor the “lukewarm but inoffensive” candidate.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Voters give each candidate a grade (from “Excellent” to “Reject”). The winner is the candidate with the best median grade.
For
- Expresses the intensity of support, not just the order.
- Always produces a winner, with no cycles to break.
- A very readable ballot: one grade per candidate.
Against
- The median can shift depending on how each side grades (an incentive to grade at the extremes).
- What the grades mean (“Good” vs. “Fairly good”) remains subjective.
- Can eliminate a candidate who would beat everyone else head-to-head.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Voters rank the candidates, from favorite to least liked. Candidates are compared two by two; the winner is the one who beats every other candidate head-to-head.
For
- The winner beats every opponent one-on-one: a legitimacy that is hard to dispute.
- Ranking by preference is intuitive and hard to game.
- You can put your true favorite — even a long-shot candidate — first without “wasting” your vote.
Against
- Rare cases with no clear winner (“cycles”) require a tie-breaking rule.
- The count takes longer to explain than a simple vote total.
- You have to rank all the candidates, which can be tedious when there are many.
In concrete terms: blank ballots are counted as valid votes cast — that is the fixed commitment. Their exact effect, like everything else, is chosen at the referendum.
What effect should blank ballots have? The fixed commitment: blank ballots are counted as valid votes. What remains to be chosen is their effect: four options, one checkbox on the referendum ballot.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Blank ballots enter the count: candidates’ scores drop mechanically and the rejection becomes visible and official. The election remains valid no matter what.
For
- Simple, with no risk of institutional deadlock.
- The message is public and quantified at every election.
- An easy first step for everyone to accept.
Against
- A massive rejection changes nothing in practice.
- Can fuel frustration: “counted, but ignored.”
Open to debate the case for and against ›
If the blank vote gets the best score of all the “candidates” (even without an absolute majority), the election is rerun with new candidates.
For
- The most readable rule: if rejection wins, we start over.
- Consistent with the spirit of the vote: the blank ballot is a “candidate” like any other.
Against
- Can trigger on a relatively low score if votes are very scattered.
- Reruns cost time and money.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
If blank ballots win a majority, the election is rerun with new candidates. The people can reject the entire slate.
For
- The blank ballot becomes a real power, not a symbol.
- Forces parties to put forward acceptable candidates.
- A demanding threshold: only triggers on a massive rejection.
Against
- Reruns cost time and money.
- A period of uncertainty between the two votes.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
The election is rerun as soon as blank ballots pass 30%. The power to refuse kicks in earlier.
For
- A strong but minority rejection is already enough to reshuffle the deck.
- Maximum incentive to renew the political offer.
Against
- Risk of elections being rerun often.
- The right threshold is hard to set: too low destabilizes, too high does nothing.
In concrete terms: abolish sponsorship signatures from elected officials. To run for president, a candidate needs enough signatures from citizens (say, 100,000), validated a set time before the election (say, 6 months).
- The official list of candidates is thus known several months in advance.
- Which triggers the legal obligation, for the media, to apply the airtime rule throughout that period (see measure 7).
How many signatures, and validated when? The principle is fixed: only citizens sponsor candidates (no more sponsorship by elected officials). Two questions remain to settle, independent of each other — the same as on the ballot: the signature threshold (A), and the validation deadline before the vote (B).
Open to debate the case for and against ›
The most accessible threshold: the door stays open to candidacies without a big machine behind them.
For
- Reachable without an established party or deep pockets.
- Lets new candidacies emerge.
Against
- A weak filter: risk of an overcrowded ballot.
- Does little to deter token candidacies.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
The middle threshold: a real test of support, without crushing modest candidacies.
For
- A serious filter without being crushing.
- A clear bar, known in advance, easy to aim for.
Against
- The right figure is still arbitrary.
- Needs revising as the population changes.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
The demanding threshold: for candidacies able to mobilize widely, and early.
For
- Guarantees candidacies of national scope.
- A tighter ballot, easier to read on election day.
Against
- Hard to gather without name recognition or networks.
- May shut out sincere but modest candidacies.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
The threshold tracks the population: 1% of registered voters, recalculated at each election.
For
- Adjusts on its own to demographics.
- Stays fair over time.
Against
- The highest bar of the four.
- Less intuitive than a round number.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Sponsorships stay open almost until the campaign: the list of candidates is set late.
For
- Gives late candidacies, born of current events, their chance.
- A short collection window, cheaper to run.
Against
- Little time to verify signatures calmly.
- The airtime rule (reform 7) only protects qualified candidates near the end.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
The balance: the list of candidates is known six months before the vote, and the campaign settles in.
For
- Time to verify signatures and settle disputes.
- Six months of campaigning on equal footing for all qualified candidates.
Against
- Closes the door on last-minute candidacies.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
The list is set three quarters before the vote: room for a long campaign of substance.
For
- Calm verification, no race against the clock.
- A long campaign, with time to compare ideas.
Against
- Freezes the field very early: events can still change, the candidates no longer can.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Everything is known a year ahead: qualified candidates have twelve months to make their case.
For
- The most time on equal footing to become known.
- Voters compare at length, far from the final sprint.
Against
- A year-long campaign is long (fatigue, cost).
- Locks the field a year in advance.
In concrete terms: ban the publication of horse-race polls (voting-intention polls) — about candidates or parties — permanently, including outside election season. These polls don't measure opinion: they manufacture it, through biases that are now well documented.
- Bandwagon effect: people rally behind the candidate said to be winning — herd behavior at work.
- Anchoring bias: the poll number becomes the mental reference point that locks in the perception of who is “viable.”
- Spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann): people keep quiet about opinions they believe are in the minority, which sinks those opinions further.
- Self-fulfilling prophecy: the poll creates the very result it claims to predict.
- Manufacturing “tactical voting”: by designating the “viable” candidates, it pushes people to abandon their true favorite.
Election polls: what restriction? The goal is to restore the sincerity of the vote by curbing the bandwagon effect. What is left to decide is how far. Tick the option that speaks to you, open "Open to debate" for the case for and against.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Voting-intention polls are banned all year round, whether or not a campaign is under way.
For
- Cuts the bandwagon effect outright.
- The debate is about ideas, not who's ahead.
- A simple rule, with no exception to police.
Against
- A radical measure.
- Withholds information that many people want.
- Hard to enforce in the internet age.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Polls are allowed in normal times, but banned for the entire official campaign period.
For
- Protects the most sensitive period.
- Lets information circulate the rest of the time.
- A balance between transparency and sincerity.
Against
- Pre-campaign polls already weigh heavily.
- The campaign's start date becomes a stake.
- The bandwagon effect is merely shifted.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Polls are banned only in the very last weeks before the vote (close to today's rule, but broadened).
For
- Targets the most influential moment.
- Light-touch the rest of the time.
- Close to existing practice.
Against
- The bandwagon effect is already set before.
- The limit (how many weeks?) is still to be fixed.
- Little change from today.
In concrete terms: the creation of an independent Chamber of Journalism (independent of political power and of shareholders), made up mainly of journalists. During the campaign it enforces the airtime rule chosen by citizens (strict equality, fairness, or proportional with a minimum for newcomers). And it draws the map of media ownership: who owns what, by sector and by owner. Depending on the referendum, it can simply publish those facts, or go as far as blocking a merger that would concentrate too many media.
An independent Chamber of Journalism. Fixed point: the creation of a Chamber independent of political power and of shareholders, made up mainly of journalists, with representatives of the public. Two missions remain to settle: the airtime rule it enforces, and what it does about media ownership. Tick one option per mission, open "Open to debate" for the case for and against.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Every candidate gets exactly the same airtime, whatever their weight.
For
- Perfectly fair: no favourite.
- Everyone equally exposed.
- A simple, clear rule.
Against
- Gives as much to a fringe candidate as to a major movement.
- May dilute the debate.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
The least exposed candidates get more airtime, to offset the others' name recognition. It's the "fair trade" logic: you help those starting at a disadvantage.
For
- Gives a chance to those who are barely known.
- Corrects the advantage of incumbents and media favourites.
Against
- Deliberately disadvantages the best-known (contested).
- "Lesser-known" still has to be measured.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Airtime follows the number of elected officials of each side, with a floor for new candidates or those without officials.
For
- An objective criterion: the number of officials.
- A minimum protects newcomers.
Against
- Freezes the political landscape.
- New movements stay at a disadvantage.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
It draws and publishes the map of media ownership: who holds what, sector by sector (TV, radio, press) and owner by owner. It reports, without imposing anything.
For
- Concentration is finally clearly visible.
- Unassailable transparency: it constrains no one.
Against
- Reporting does not change ownership in itself.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Beyond the map, it can block a takeover or a merger that would concentrate too many media in the same hands.
For
- Genuinely prevents the building of empires.
- Actively protects pluralism.
Against
- More constraining: may hinder mergers needed for economic survival.
- A strong power, to be carefully framed.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
The Chamber leaves the ownership question aside.
For
- The matter is left entirely free.
Against
- Today's opacity and concentration remain.
In concrete terms: the fixed floor is clear. Any final conviction (after all appeals are exhausted) for a breach of integrity committed while exercising public office triggers ineligibility: corruption, embezzlement of public funds, unlawful conflicts of interest, illegal campaign financing. How far to extend that scope (judge’s decision case by case, or a completely clean criminal record required in all matters): that is one of the referendum’s checkboxes.
How far should ineligibility go, and who decides? The principle is fixed: keep dishonest officials out, without creating a weapon to eliminate an opponent. What remains is choosing the mechanism and its scope.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
A precise list of integrity offenses (corruption, embezzlement, unlawful conflicts of interest, etc.) triggers ineligibility automatically, upon final conviction.
For
- Predictable and the same for everyone: no political discretion.
- Targets dishonesty, not opinions — hard to weaponize.
Against
- A closed list can miss a case or need updating.
- Automatic means no room for circumstances.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Ineligibility remains an additional penalty that the judge imposes, proportionate to the seriousness of the facts.
For
- Flexible and proportionate: the penalty fits the facts.
- Covers situations a closed list would miss.
Against
- Less predictable; suspicion of unequal treatment from one judge to the next.
- A judge may hesitate to strip an official of their mandate.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
To run for office, a candidate must have a completely clean criminal record, whatever the field of the conviction.
For
- The highest moral standard for candidates.
- A crystal-clear rule: “clean record, or no candidacy.”
Against
- Becomes a weapon: a fabricated accusation could sideline an inconvenient figure (the very risk the measure aims to avoid).
- Excludes people over facts that may be old or unrelated to the office, including those who have turned their lives around.
In concrete terms, every elected official is required to:
- Explain every vote they cast — or every absence; the explanation is published in the Official Journal (France's official gazette).
- Declare every conflict of interest and every meeting with lobbyists (which, aggregated, forms the “footprint” of each law: who weighed in, and in which direction).
- Any proven omission carries sanctions graduated by severity: from fines to ineligibility and criminal penalties.
What sanctions if an official doesn't play by the transparency rules? The principle is fixed: every elected official explains their votes and discloses their meetings with lobbyists, in the official gazette. What remains is deciding what happens if they don't.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Everything is published in the official gazette, but no penalty is added: public scrutiny is the sanction.
For
- Simple to apply: publish, and that's it.
- Respects the mandate: it's up to voters to judge, not a court.
- Avoids any permanent judicial “hunt” against officeholders.
Against
- Not very dissuasive for an official who doesn't care.
- Uneven effect: a high-profile official is exposed, another flies under the radar.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
The penalty scales with the seriousness of the breach: from a simple fine up to ineligibility for office, even criminal charges in the most serious cases.
For
- Proportionate: the penalty fits the offense.
- Dissuasive without being heavy-handed over a small mistake.
- Distinguishes a minor oversight from deliberate concealment.
Against
- Who judges the seriousness? Risk of arbitrariness.
- Heavier to implement: it takes a body to decide.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Once a serious omission is proven, the penalty applies automatically: ineligibility for office, with no case-by-case discretion.
For
- Highly dissuasive: the rule is clear-cut.
- The same for everyone, with no subjective call by any body.
Against
- Can punish an honest mistake the same as fraud.
- Rigid: no room for nuance based on context.
The authorities meant to hold power to account must not be appointed by that power.
- Public prosecutors: prosecutors are no longer appointed or instructed by the Minister of Justice. Appointments and discipline go through the High Council of the Judiciary (with binding approval); instructions in individual cases are prohibited.
- ARCOM (France's media regulator): its members are no longer appointed by political powerholders (the President of the Republic, the presidents of the two chambers). A depoliticized appointment process, so it can enforce media impartiality without depending on those it oversees.
How do we appoint these authorities without making them dependent on those in power? The principle is fixed: public prosecutors and the media watchdog — France's media regulator (ARCOM) — must no longer be appointed by the very people they are supposed to keep in check. What remains is choosing how they are selected.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Appointing these officials requires a broad share of the votes of members of parliament and senators (for example three-fifths).
For
- Forces the majority and the opposition to agree: no one can install “their” candidate alone.
- The person chosen carries real democratic legitimacy.
Against
- Risk of deadlock if the sides can't reach an agreement.
- It's still an appointment decided by politicians.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Judges and prosecutors, or professionals in the sector, choose their own leadership themselves.
For
- Genuine independence from politicians.
- The competence of those chosen is assured.
Against
- Risk of an insular circle and guild mentality (choosing among themselves).
- Weak democratic legitimacy: citizens have no say.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Selection is shared between Parliament, peers, and civil society, possibly with a share chosen by lot.
For
- Balances the different sources of legitimacy (political, professional, civic).
- Keeps any single camp from locking everything down.
Against
- A more complex system to organize.
- Hard to decide who picks “civil society.”
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Citizens chosen by lot (like a trial jury), trained and supported by experts, interview the candidates and make the call.
For
- Maximum independence: neither politicians nor guild interests — no one to owe a favor to.
- Direct popular legitimacy: these are ordinary citizens.
- Nearly impossible to capture or buy (the draw is regularly renewed).
Against
- Do citizens chosen by lot have the expertise to assess these candidates? (Hence the training and the experts.)
- A new mechanism, still little tested for this kind of appointment.
- Takes time and real support.
In concrete terms: the Constitutional Council becomes a genuine Court composed solely of qualified jurists, serving long, non-renewable terms. No more purely political appointments, and no more former presidents sitting as members by right.
Who sits on the Constitutional Court, and who appoints them? The principle is fixed: a Court of qualified jurists, serving long, non-renewable terms, without former presidents as members by right. What remains is choosing how its members are selected.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Members of parliament and senators choose the judges, but only with a broad majority (for example three-fifths of the votes).
For
- Democratic legitimacy: the judges are chosen by the people's representatives.
- The supermajority forces consensus across party lines.
Against
- The choice stays in the hands of politicians.
- Risk of parties horse-trading the seats.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
The highest courts (Court of Cassation, Council of State, Court of Auditors) select the members, from among legal professionals, not politicians.
For
- Guaranteed legal expertise: judges chosen by jurists.
- Independence from political power.
Against
- Risk of an insular circle of judges co-opting one another.
- Weak democratic legitimacy: the people have no say.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Members come from three sources at once: Parliament, the high courts, and legal scholars.
For
- Seeks a balance between legal expertise and legitimacy.
- No single actor controls the composition.
Against
- A more complex system to organize.
- The mix between the three sources is tricky to set.
In concrete terms: we cap the number of terms an official can serve over time, we limit the offices held at the same time, and the length of each term is itself put back on the table (keep the five-year presidential term or not, align MPs and senators or not…). No more lifelong political careers: turnover is guaranteed.
- Members of the National Assembly — a term whose length is open to debate (5 years today), renewable a limited number of times (e.g., 2 or 3).
- Senators — same logic, with the question of aligning their term with MPs' (their current 6-year term is longer).
- President — on top of the existing two-consecutive-term limit, a cap over an entire career, with the term length (five years or otherwise) open to debate.
- Holding several offices at once — also limit how many offices can be held simultaneously, extending the 2014 laws.
Number and length: how should terms be limited? The principle is fixed: an end to lifelong political careers, for all elected officials. Two questions remain to settle — the same as on the ballot: the rule that limits the number of terms (A), and the length of each one (B).
Open to debate the case for and against ›
You can serve 2 terms in a row, then a mandatory 4-year break before you can return. Example: a member of parliament could serve 10 straight years (2 × 5 years), then would have to step away for at least 4 years.
For
- Forces regular turnover among officeholders.
- Keeps the door open to returning after a break.
Against
- An officeholder can “rotate out and back” indefinitely.
- Turnover only happens in fits and starts.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
3 terms maximum over a lifetime, period. Example: 3 terms as senator (18 years) or 2 terms as president — once the limit is reached, you pass the torch.
For
- Guaranteed turnover among leaders.
- Puts a clean end to politics as a career.
Against
- Loses capable, experienced officeholders.
- A rule seen as harsh and inflexible.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
No one may spend more than 12 years in the same office. Example: at most 12 years as a member of parliament, 12 years as a senator, 10 years as president (two 5-year terms) — however the terms are strung together.
For
- A rule that is simple and readable for everyone.
Against
- The 12-year figure is still arbitrary.
- Easy to sidestep by switching offices.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
Nothing changes about lengths: presidency and National Assembly on 5 years, Senate on 6 years. Only the rule on the number of terms (question A) reins in careers.
For
- Familiar benchmarks, zero upheaval in the electoral calendar.
- The limit on the number applies with no further reform.
Against
- Keeps the offset between MPs and senators.
- Misses the chance to overhaul the electoral calendar.
Open to debate the case for and against ›
A return to the long view for the presidency, while the whole Parliament moves to 5 years. Example: the pre-2002 seven-year term comes back, but with MPs AND senators on 5 years.
For
- Decouples the presidential race from parliamentary elections: each vote gets its own stakes back.
- Gives the arbiter role time to work, away from the permanent campaign rhythm.
Against
- 7 years without facing voters is a long stretch.
- Reopens a debate settled by referendum in 2000 (the switch to 5-year terms).
Open to debate the case for and against ›
One length for every elected office: 5 years, from the president to senators. Example: senators would go from 6 to 5 years; presidential and parliamentary elections keep their rhythm.
For
- A single, readable rule: five years for everyone.
- Ends the offset between the two chambers.
Against
- Elections may bunch up in the same years.
- The Senate loses the long view that sets it apart.
On a Sunday, exactly one year after the presidential election, everyone votes. For each reform, the ballot presents the options debated during the year: just check the one you prefer. The result goes directly into the Constitution. So it is the French people's choice that applies, exactly as cast.