Concrete · institutional · cross-partisan

Twelve concrete reforms all parties could vote for

No vague principles: precise measures, like the RIC. Each one fits on a ballot, and you know exactly what it changes. All of them concern the rules of the democratic game: who votes, who gets elected, who informs, who holds power to account. They favor no side in particular: they serve everyone.
📆 12 months of debate 🗳️ 1 single referendum 🏛️ written into the Constitution ⭐ the RIC comes first
The method. Every measure is concrete and clear-cut. Whenever a detail remains open (the voting method, an appointment process…), it is flagged ⚙️ Open to debate — to be settled through public debate and then the referendum. And whenever a choice deserves a real decision, it is laid out in an expandable box with, for each option, its arguments for and against — with no thumb on the scale. Deciding together, with full knowledge of the facts: that is the spirit of the PACTE.

★ The democratic foundation

1
★ The keystone measure

The RIC — the citizens' initiative referendum

In concrete terms: as soon as enough citizens request it (by signature), a national referendum is held — to propose a law, repeal one, recall an elected official, or amend the Constitution. The result is binding on those in power.

Problem solved
Being dispossessed between two elections: citizens have no way to initiate anything, and no way to block anything.
Fixed commitment
No restriction on subject matter (budget or otherwise) and no restriction on scope (laws, officials, treaties, the Constitution). This is the RIC's one non-negotiable point.
On the ballot
⚙️
At the referendum: the trigger threshold (the options below). The frequency, the organization and the validation rules will then be set by organic law, and stay adjustable afterwards by the RIC itself.

What threshold should trigger a citizens' initiative referendum (RIC) — not too easy, not too hard? The commitment is fixed: no restriction on subject or scope (laws, officials, treaties, the Constitution). The real dial to set is how easy it is to trigger: accessible enough to be genuinely useful, demanding enough to stay serious.

① An accessible threshold
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Triggering is fairly easy: a moderate number of signatures is enough to launch a referendum — for example 1% of registered voters, roughly 500,000 people.

For
  • A direct democracy that is alive and well in everyday life.
  • The people use it for real, not just on paper.
  • A tool within reach of citizens and grassroots groups.
Against
  • Risk of referendums coming too often.
  • Instability: the rules could change constantly.
  • Voter fatigue from being called to the polls so often.
② A high threshold
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Triggering is rare: it takes a lot of signatures — for example 5% of registered voters, roughly 2.4 million people — so the RIC is reserved for the big questions.

For
  • The people are only called on for what matters most.
  • Stability: few votes, lasting rules.
  • Each referendum keeps real weight.
Against
  • Could make the RIC nearly unusable.
  • Becomes a de facto lock rather than a real right.
  • Issues with less media attention would never reach the threshold.
③ A multi-tier system
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Several parameters are combined: a signature threshold, a collection deadline, and a turnout quorum for the vote.

For
  • Balance: accessible yet serious.
  • Built-in safeguards against abuse.
  • Each tier can be fine-tuned.
Against
  • Harder to explain.
  • Several parameters to set at once.
  • A poorly set quorum can block the outcome.
④ A gradual ramp-down
Open to debate the case for and against ›

The threshold starts high, then is lowered in steps after a few years of practice (for example 2% at first, 1% after five years).

For
  • The country gets comfortable with the tool gradually.
  • Reassures those who fear overuse.
  • The ramp-down schedule is known in advance.
Against
  • The RIC is hard to use at first.
  • Two successive rules to explain.
  • The steps themselves still have to be decided.
💡 Also on the table: entrusting the organization and oversight of RICs to a citizens' chamber selected by lot, renewed regularly — one idea among others to keep the tool in citizens' hands.
The other details (frequency, organization, constitutional review) are settled the same way. Settled by public debate, then by the referendum.
🌍 Elsewhere: 🇨🇭 Switzerland has used the popular initiative since 1891 — 100,000 signatures (≈ 1.8% of registered voters) trigger a national vote.
✓
A vote everyone can cast — every party believes it can win the people over, and all of them recognize the people's right to decide.
2

A mandatory referendum to amend the Constitution or transfer sovereignty

In concrete terms: no constitutional amendment without a citizens' vote. How far to close the Congress route (where Parliament amends the Constitution among itself) — for every amendment, or only for the democratic ground rules — is exactly what the debate, and then the referendum, will decide.

Problem solved
The wound of 2005: France voted “no” in a referendum on the European constitutional treaty — and in 2008, Parliament meeting as Congress passed essentially the same text anyway.
🌍 Elsewhere: in 🇮🇪 Ireland, every constitutional amendment must go through a referendum — since 1937, and it works.

The Constitution belongs to the people. The fixed point: no more amendments without the citizens' vote (the Congress route, where Parliament alone decides, is gone). Two questions remain to settle, independent of each other. Tick one option per question, open "Open to debate" for the case for and against.

A · By which path? Who may amend?
① Every amendment goes to a referendum, initiated by elected officials only
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Elected officials keep the power to propose an amendment, but the people always decide, by referendum. The Congress route (amendment by Parliament alone) is removed.

For
  • No more amendments decided without the citizens' vote.
  • The final word always belongs to the people.
  • A simple rule: one amendment, one referendum.
Against
  • The initiative stays in the hands of officials.
  • Citizens cannot launch an amendment themselves.
  • Can slow down consensual technical adjustments.
② Referendum required for democratic ground rules; Congress still allowed for the rest
Open to debate the case for and against ›

A referendum becomes mandatory for everything touching the democratic ground rules (voting method, term limits, freedoms). For the rest, the Congress route stays available.

For
  • Protects the essentials without weighing everything down.
  • Keeps flexibility for technical amendments.
  • Clearly marks what belongs to the people.
Against
  • The "ground rules" / "the rest" line is to be defined.
  • Leaves an area to Parliament alone.
  • Risk of disputes over the scope.
③ Every amendment goes to a referendum, and citizens can also trigger one (constitutional RIC)
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Every amendment goes to a referendum, and citizens can also trigger one themselves: a citizens' initiative that bears on the Constitution.

For
  • The people can propose AND decide.
  • The most direct democracy.
  • Consistent with the spirit of the RIC.
Against
  • Risk of too-frequent amendments to the founding text.
  • Requires a solid framework to stay serious.
  • The stability of the Constitution must be watched.
B · On top of a majority, should a minimum turnout be required?

In every case, an amendment first needs a majority of the votes (the "yes" wins). The question here: should a participation condition be required on top of that, to reassure those who fear that a small number could decide for everyone?

① A turnout quorum: at least 75% of registered voters must take part
Open to debate the case for and against ›

An amendment is validated only if at least 75% of registered voters have voted, on top of a majority of yes votes.

For
  • An amendment cannot pass on low turnout.
  • Requires a genuine mobilisation of the country.
  • Strengthens the legitimacy of the change.
Against
  • Such a rate is rarely reached (risk of blocking everything).
  • Rewards the boycott: opponents win by staying home.
  • Can freeze the Constitution for a long time.
② An approval quorum: the "yes" must gather at least 50% of all registered voters
Open to debate the case for and against ›

The "yes" is counted against all registered voters, not just those who voted: it must gather at least 50%.

For
  • Requires broad support, not a chance majority.
  • Does not reward the boycott: abstaining means not supporting.
  • Fairer than a turnout quorum.
Against
  • A high bar to clear.
  • A supported but low-mobilising reform can fail.
  • A less intuitive notion to explain.
③ No quorum: a majority of those who vote is enough
Open to debate the case for and against ›

As today: the majority of those who vote wins, with no turnout threshold.

For
  • Simple and clear.
  • No premium on abstention.
  • Respects the vote of those who turn out.
Against
  • Does not ease the fear of a small number deciding.
  • Low turnout can be enough.
  • Legitimacy sometimes contested.
Decided by public debate and then the referendum.
✓
A vote everyone can cast — let citizens settle their own fundamental rules themselves.

🗳️ How we vote

3

Reform the voting system to end “tactical voting”

In concrete terms: replace the two-round, single-member voting system with a method that lets people express a genuine choice — where you can back your true favorite without fearing you'll “waste” your vote, and without being reduced to voting against someone. Several methods make this possible; which one to adopt is exactly what must be decided together.

Problem solved
Tactical voting, voting against, no room for nuance: a system that forces people to give up their real preferences.
Fixed commitment
Move away from the two-round system toward a more expressive, more representative method. Exactly which method remains open — see the debate below.

Which voting method should we adopt? No option is imposed here. These are the main known methods: each one fixes “tactical voting” in its own way, with its own strengths and limits. The idea is to debate them and decide together, through public debate and then the referendum.

① Simple plurality: tick a single candidate
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Each voter ticks one single candidate. The one with the most votes wins, even without an absolute majority. It is the most widespread system, and the most disputed.

For
  • Very simple to understand and to count.
  • An immediate result: one ballot, one cross.
  • Familiar to everyone.
Against
  • Pushes toward tactical voting and voting against.
  • A candidate can win with a small minority.
  • Crushes long-shot candidates by default.
② Two-round runoff: keep the top two
Open to debate the case for and against ›

If no one has an absolute majority in the first round, the top two face off in a second. It is the current system for the French presidential election.

For
  • The winner ends up with a majority in the runoff.
  • Well known and tested in France.
  • Leaves a second chance to transfer support.
Against
  • Tactical voting in the first round is still strong.
  • Can eliminate in round one a candidate who beat everyone head-to-head.
  • Two trips to the polls.
③ Instant-runoff voting — rank, then eliminate
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Voters rank the candidates. The last-place candidate is eliminated and their votes are transferred to the next choice, round after round, until someone has a majority.

For
  • No more tactical voting: you can rank your favorite 1st without risk.
  • Battle-tested (Australia, Ireland) and fairly intuitive.
  • The winner ends up with a majority after transfers.
Against
  • The round-by-round count is longer to explain.
  • Can, in rare cases, eliminate a candidate who would have beaten everyone head-to-head (unlike Condorcet).
  • The elimination order can produce unintuitive results.
④ Borda count — rank them, every rank earns points
Open to debate the case for and against ›

The voter ranks the candidates. Each rank earns points (with 5 candidates: 4 points for 1st, 3 for 2nd… 0 for last). The candidate with the most points wins.

For
  • Very simple to count: just add up points.
  • Favors broadly accepted candidates over divisive ones.
  • Long track record (national elections in Nauru, prizes, committees).
Against
  • Open to manipulation: deliberately ranking your main rival last skews the score.
  • The points scale is arbitrary.
  • Can elect a “lukewarm” candidate who is nobody’s first choice.
⑤ Score voting — give every candidate a grade
Open to debate the case for and against ›

The voter gives each candidate a score (for example 0 to 5), independently of the others. The candidate with the best average (or highest total) wins.

For
  • Expresses the intensity of support, nuance by nuance.
  • Intuitive ballot: everyone knows how to grade.
  • You can score several candidates highly without hurting any of them.
Against
  • Encourages extreme scoring (0 or 5) to carry more weight.
  • An average is easier to manipulate than a median.
  • What “3 out of 5” means varies from voter to voter.
⑥ Approval voting — check everyone you accept
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Voters check every candidate they approve of (as many as they like). The winner is the candidate with the most approvals.

For
  • Very simple: a ballot with checkboxes, nothing to rank or grade.
  • Favors the most broadly acceptable candidates; you are never penalized for approving your favorite.
  • Easy counting (simple addition).
Against
  • Says nothing about intensity or order: “I love them” and “I can live with them” count the same.
  • Invites strategizing: how far should you extend your approvals?
  • Can favor the “lukewarm but inoffensive” candidate.
⑦ Majority judgment — grade the candidates
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Voters give each candidate a grade (from “Excellent” to “Reject”). The winner is the candidate with the best median grade.

For
  • Expresses the intensity of support, not just the order.
  • Always produces a winner, with no cycles to break.
  • A very readable ballot: one grade per candidate.
Against
  • The median can shift depending on how each side grades (an incentive to grade at the extremes).
  • What the grades mean (“Good” vs. “Fairly good”) remains subjective.
  • Can eliminate a candidate who would beat everyone else head-to-head.
⑧ Condorcet method — rank the candidates
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Voters rank the candidates, from favorite to least liked. Candidates are compared two by two; the winner is the one who beats every other candidate head-to-head.

For
  • The winner beats every opponent one-on-one: a legitimacy that is hard to dispute.
  • Ranking by preference is intuitive and hard to game.
  • You can put your true favorite — even a long-shot candidate — first without “wasting” your vote.
Against
  • Rare cases with no clear winner (“cycles”) require a tie-breaking rule.
  • The count takes longer to explain than a simple vote total.
  • You have to rank all the candidates, which can be tedious when there are many.
📊 What about proportional representation? It is not a voting method in itself: it is a way of allocating an assembly's seats. It can be combined with any of the methods above (a German-style mixed system, for example). The share of proportional seats is therefore a related question, to be settled in the debate.
💡 Also on the table, whatever the voting method: hand-marked ballots counted by hand (paper, hands, eyes — trust is verified in every polling place) and a single checkbox ballot (one ballot listing all the candidates, instead of a separate slip for each — simpler, and real savings on printing). Ideas to bring to the debate, like the others.
This comparison doesn't settle anything: it lays out the terms. The final choice will come from public debate and then the referendum — the very spirit of the PACTE: deciding together, with full knowledge of the facts.
🌍 Elsewhere: 🇦🇺 Australia has used instant-runoff voting since 1918, and 🇮🇪 Ireland elects its president the same way — and both count their ballots by hand. 🧪 Want to try them out? Test each method on the voting simulator →
✓
A vote everyone can cast — end “tactical voting” so everyone can back their true favorite. As for the method, nothing is decided in advance: we debate it and choose it together.
4

Count blank ballots

In concrete terms: blank ballots are counted as valid votes cast — that is the fixed commitment. Their exact effect, like everything else, is chosen at the referendum.

Problem solved
There is currently no way to reject the political offering other than staying home.
Fine-tuning
⚙️
Open to debate: the exact effect of blank ballots (four options, detailed below). A checkbox on the referendum ballot.

What effect should blank ballots have? The fixed commitment: blank ballots are counted as valid votes. What remains to be chosen is their effect: four options, one checkbox on the referendum ballot.

① Counted, with no further effect
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Blank ballots enter the count: candidates’ scores drop mechanically and the rejection becomes visible and official. The election remains valid no matter what.

For
  • Simple, with no risk of institutional deadlock.
  • The message is public and quantified at every election.
  • An easy first step for everyone to accept.
Against
  • A massive rejection changes nothing in practice.
  • Can fuel frustration: “counted, but ignored.”
② Voids the election if it comes first, whatever its score
Open to debate the case for and against ›

If the blank vote gets the best score of all the “candidates” (even without an absolute majority), the election is rerun with new candidates.

For
  • The most readable rule: if rejection wins, we start over.
  • Consistent with the spirit of the vote: the blank ballot is a “candidate” like any other.
Against
  • Can trigger on a relatively low score if votes are very scattered.
  • Reruns cost time and money.
③ Above 50% blank ballots, the election is voided
Open to debate the case for and against ›

If blank ballots win a majority, the election is rerun with new candidates. The people can reject the entire slate.

For
  • The blank ballot becomes a real power, not a symbol.
  • Forces parties to put forward acceptable candidates.
  • A demanding threshold: only triggers on a massive rejection.
Against
  • Reruns cost time and money.
  • A period of uncertainty between the two votes.
④ Same rule, but from 30% blank ballots
Open to debate the case for and against ›

The election is rerun as soon as blank ballots pass 30%. The power to refuse kicks in earlier.

For
  • A strong but minority rejection is already enough to reshuffle the deck.
  • Maximum incentive to renew the political offer.
Against
  • Risk of elections being rerun often.
  • The right threshold is hard to set: too low destabilizes, too high does nothing.
Related questions: what happens to candidates defeated by the blank vote (can they run again?), and the delay before the new election. Settled by public debate, then by the referendum.
🌍 Elsewhere: in 🇨🇴 Colombia, if the “blank vote” wins a majority, the election is rerun — and the defeated candidates cannot run again.
✓
A vote everyone can cast — simple and symbolically powerful; it pushes parties to renew what they offer. Nobody loses.

📣 A fair campaign

5

100% citizen ballot access, validated well before the election

In concrete terms: abolish sponsorship signatures from elected officials. To run for president, a candidate needs enough signatures from citizens (say, 100,000), validated a set time before the election (say, 6 months).

  • The official list of candidates is thus known several months in advance.
  • Which triggers the legal obligation, for the media, to apply the airtime rule throughout that period (see measure 7).
Problem solved
Ballot access gatekept by elected officials and subject to pressure; and unequal airtime because the list of candidates isn't known early enough. The current system is broken: since 2017 every sponsor's name has been published, and as a result nearly 7 in 10 eligible officials no longer use their sponsorship power (in 2022: 13,427 validated sponsorships out of more than 42,000 eligible officials). The reasons: sponsorship gets mistaken for an endorsement, many mayors fear retaliation on their subsidies, and a large share of potential sponsors are party members, bound by party discipline.
On the ballot
⚙️
Two questions put to the vote: the number of signatures and the cutoff date before the vote (the options below). The figures mentioned above (100,000, 6 months) are only examples.

How many signatures, and under what rules? The principle is fixed: only citizens sponsor candidates (no more sponsorship by elected officials). What remains is setting the threshold and the safeguards.

① A fixed number of signatures
Open to debate the case for and against ›

A set figure (e.g. ~100,000), to be gathered by a set deadline before the election.

For
  • Simple and clear: everyone knows the rule.
  • Known in advance, easy to aim for.
Against
  • The right figure is arbitrary.
  • Needs revising as the population changes.
② A percentage of registered voters
Open to debate the case for and against ›

The threshold tracks the population (e.g. 1% of registered voters, about 490,000 signatures).

For
  • Adjusts on its own to demographics.
  • Stays fair over time.
Against
  • Less intuitive than a round number.
  • One more calculation to explain.
③ With a geographic-spread requirement
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Signatures must come from several regions, so a single stronghold isn't enough.

For
  • Favors candidates with broad support.
  • Screens out purely local candidacies.
Against
  • Harder to gather for lesser-known candidates.
  • More complex to verify.
💡 Also on the table: once a candidacy qualifies, the state prints and funds the posters and ballots of every candidate, on equal terms — candidates are filtered by citizens' signatures, not by money. An idea to bring to the debate.
Related question: the cutoff deadline before the election (e.g. 6 months, which is when equal airtime kicks in). Settled by public debate, then by the referendum.
✓
A vote everyone can cast — it opens up access to candidacy and guarantees every candidate fair exposure; the only losers are the party machines that used to control the gate.
6

Ban election polls — permanently, not just during campaigns

In concrete terms: ban the publication of horse-race polls (voting-intention polls) — about candidates or parties — permanently, including outside election season. These polls don't measure opinion: they manufacture it, through biases that are now well documented.

  • Bandwagon effect: people rally behind the candidate said to be winning — herd behavior at work.
  • Anchoring bias: the poll number becomes the mental reference point that locks in the perception of who is “viable.”
  • Spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann): people keep quiet about opinions they believe are in the minority, which sinks those opinions further.
  • Self-fulfilling prophecy: the poll creates the very result it claims to predict.
  • Manufacturing “tactical voting”: by designating the “viable” candidates, it pushes people to abandon their true favorite.
Problem solved
A political life steered around the clock by polls that manufacture the very opinion they claim to measure.
Clarification
Only voting-intention polls are covered; opinion surveys on issues (rather than on candidates) remain possible, with full transparency about who commissioned them. How far to go (a permanent ban, a campaign-period ban, or just the final weeks) is among the options put to the referendum.
🌍 Elsewhere: 🇮🇹 Italy already bans the publication of election polls during the final 15 days of a campaign; France does so only the day before and the day of the vote.

Election polls: what restriction? The goal is to restore the sincerity of the vote by curbing the bandwagon effect. What is left to decide is how far. Tick the option that speaks to you, open "Open to debate" for the case for and against.

① Permanent ban (all year round, election or not)
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Voting-intention polls are banned all year round, whether or not a campaign is under way.

For
  • Cuts the bandwagon effect outright.
  • The debate is about ideas, not who's ahead.
  • A simple rule, with no exception to police.
Against
  • A radical measure.
  • Withholds information that many people want.
  • Hard to enforce in the internet age.
② Banned throughout the official campaign
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Polls are allowed in normal times, but banned for the entire official campaign period.

For
  • Protects the most sensitive period.
  • Lets information circulate the rest of the time.
  • A balance between transparency and sincerity.
Against
  • Pre-campaign polls already weigh heavily.
  • The campaign's start date becomes a stake.
  • The bandwagon effect is merely shifted.
③ Banned in the final weeks before the vote
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Polls are banned only in the very last weeks before the vote (close to today's rule, but broadened).

For
  • Targets the most influential moment.
  • Light-touch the rest of the time.
  • Close to existing practice.
Against
  • The bandwagon effect is already set before.
  • The limit (how many weeks?) is still to be fixed.
  • Little change from today.
🌍 Elsewhere: 🇮🇹 Italy already bans publishing election polls in the final 15 days of the campaign; 🇫🇷 France does so the day before and the day of the vote.
✓
A vote everyone can cast — it restores honest voting; the only losers are the polling firms and the influence strategists.
7

An independent Chamber of Journalism

In concrete terms: the creation of an independent Chamber of Journalism (independent of political power and of shareholders), made up mainly of journalists. During the campaign it enforces the airtime rule chosen by citizens (strict equality, fairness, or proportional with a minimum for newcomers). And it draws the map of media ownership: who owns what, by sector and by owner. Depending on the referendum, it can simply publish those facts, or go as far as blocking a merger that would concentrate too many media.

Problem solved
Airtime allocated according to presumed “weight” (i.e., the polls), and opaque media ownership whose concentration no one really measures.
Fine-tuning
⚙️
Open to debate: the airtime rule, and how far the Chamber acts on media ownership.

An independent Chamber of Journalism. Fixed point: the creation of a Chamber independent of political power and of shareholders, made up mainly of journalists, with representatives of the public. Two missions remain to settle: the airtime rule it enforces, and what it does about media ownership. Tick one option per mission, open "Open to debate" for the case for and against.

A · Airtime: which rule does the Chamber enforce?
① Strict equality: the same airtime for every candidate
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Every candidate gets exactly the same airtime, whatever their weight.

For
  • Perfectly fair: no favourite.
  • Everyone equally exposed.
  • A simple, clear rule.
Against
  • Gives as much to a fringe candidate as to a major movement.
  • May dilute the debate.
② Fairness: more airtime for the lesser-known candidates, to rebalance
Open to debate the case for and against ›

The least exposed candidates get more airtime, to offset the others' name recognition. It's the "fair trade" logic: you help those starting at a disadvantage.

For
  • Gives a chance to those who are barely known.
  • Corrects the advantage of incumbents and media favourites.
Against
  • Deliberately disadvantages the best-known (contested).
  • "Lesser-known" still has to be measured.
③ Proportional to sitting officials, with a guaranteed minimum for new candidates
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Airtime follows the number of elected officials of each side, with a floor for new candidates or those without officials.

For
  • An objective criterion: the number of officials.
  • A minimum protects newcomers.
Against
  • Freezes the political landscape.
  • New movements stay at a disadvantage.
B · Media ownership: what does the Chamber do?
① Observatory: it measures and publishes who owns what (by sector and by owner)
In plain terms: it draws and publishes the map of who owns which media, sector by sector. It reports, without imposing anything.
Open to debate the case for and against ›

It draws and publishes the map of media ownership: who holds what, sector by sector (TV, radio, press) and owner by owner. It reports, without imposing anything.

For
  • Concentration is finally clearly visible.
  • Unassailable transparency: it constrains no one.
Against
  • Reporting does not change ownership in itself.
② It can block a merger or an excessive concentration of media
In plain terms: it can block a takeover or a merger that would put too many media in the same hands.
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Beyond the map, it can block a takeover or a merger that would concentrate too many media in the same hands.

For
  • Genuinely prevents the building of empires.
  • Actively protects pluralism.
Against
  • More constraining: may hinder mergers needed for economic survival.
  • A strong power, to be carefully framed.
③ It does not deal with ownership
Open to debate the case for and against ›

The Chamber leaves the ownership question aside.

For
  • The matter is left entirely free.
Against
  • Today's opacity and concentration remain.
💡 Also on the table: the Chamber's exact composition (share of journalists, of citizens drawn by lot) and its independent funding. A lead to bring to the debate.
The Chamber enforces the airtime rule chosen by citizens; on ownership, the debate ranges from simple transparency to the power to block a merger. Settled by public debate, then by the referendum.
✓
A vote everyone can cast — equal access to the airwaves and media pluralism are the bedrock of an informed vote; every political current benefits in turn.

🛡️ Integrity & transparency

8

Ineligibility for corruption, with its scope chosen by referendum

In concrete terms: the fixed floor is clear. Any final conviction (after all appeals are exhausted) for a breach of integrity committed while exercising public office triggers ineligibility: corruption, embezzlement of public funds, unlawful conflicts of interest, illegal campaign financing. How far to extend that scope (judge’s decision case by case, or a completely clean criminal record required in all matters): that is one of the referendum’s checkboxes.

Why not include everything: a broad rule becomes a weapon. An accusation can be fabricated or weaponized to neutralize an inconvenient figure — a frequently cited case is Julian Assange, whose defenders argue that the “rape” proceedings in Sweden (since dropped) served mainly to silence him and “make an example.” Targeting integrity offenses only, and requiring a final conviction, closes that door.
Problem solved
Twofold: impunity for corruption, and the risk that an overly broad rule becomes a tool for eliminating political opponents.
Fine-tuning
⚙️
Open to debate: the exact list of integrity offenses covered and the duration of ineligibility.

How far should ineligibility go, and who decides? The principle is fixed: keep dishonest officials out, without creating a weapon to eliminate an opponent. What remains is choosing the mechanism and its scope.

① A closed list + automatic ineligibility
Open to debate the case for and against ›

A precise list of integrity offenses (corruption, embezzlement, unlawful conflicts of interest, etc.) triggers ineligibility automatically, upon final conviction.

For
  • Predictable and the same for everyone: no political discretion.
  • Targets dishonesty, not opinions — hard to weaponize.
Against
  • A closed list can miss a case or need updating.
  • Automatic means no room for circumstances.
② The judge decides case by case
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Ineligibility remains an additional penalty that the judge imposes, proportionate to the seriousness of the facts.

For
  • Flexible and proportionate: the penalty fits the facts.
  • Covers situations a closed list would miss.
Against
  • Less predictable; suspicion of unequal treatment from one judge to the next.
  • A judge may hesitate to strip an official of their mandate.
③ A completely clean criminal record, in all matters
Open to debate the case for and against ›

To run for office, a candidate must have a completely clean criminal record, whatever the field of the conviction.

For
  • The highest moral standard for candidates.
  • A crystal-clear rule: “clean record, or no candidacy.”
Against
  • Becomes a weapon: a fabricated accusation could sideline an inconvenient figure (the very risk the measure aims to avoid).
  • Excludes people over facts that may be old or unrelated to the office, including those who have turned their lives around.
Related question: the duration of ineligibility (e.g. 5 years, 10 years, or for life). Settled by public debate, then by the referendum.
🌍 Elsewhere: in 🇧🇷 Brazil, the “Ficha Limpa” law (“clean record,” 2010), born of a popular initiative, bars candidacies by people convicted by a panel of judges.
✓
A vote everyone can cast — it strikes at corruption without creating a tool for political elimination; every side is protected by it.
9

Every elected official explains their votes and declares their lobbies and conflicts of interest

In concrete terms, every elected official is required to:

  • Explain every vote they cast — or every absence; the explanation is published in the Official Journal (France's official gazette).
  • Declare every conflict of interest and every meeting with lobbyists (which, aggregated, forms the “footprint” of each law: who weighed in, and in which direction).
  • Any proven omission carries sanctions graduated by severity: from fines to ineligibility and criminal penalties.
Problem solved
Elected officials who vote without answering to anyone, and lobbying influence that today remains largely invisible.
Fine-tuning
⚙️
Open to debate: the exact scale of sanctions according to the severity of the breach.

What sanctions if an official doesn't play by the transparency rules? The principle is fixed: every elected official explains their votes and discloses their meetings with lobbyists, in the official gazette. What remains is deciding what happens if they don't.

① Transparency alone
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Everything is published in the official gazette, but no penalty is added: public scrutiny is the sanction.

For
  • Simple to apply: publish, and that's it.
  • Respects the mandate: it's up to voters to judge, not a court.
  • Avoids any permanent judicial “hunt” against officeholders.
Against
  • Not very dissuasive for an official who doesn't care.
  • Uneven effect: a high-profile official is exposed, another flies under the radar.
② Graduated sanctions
Open to debate the case for and against ›

The penalty scales with the seriousness of the breach: from a simple fine up to ineligibility for office, even criminal charges in the most serious cases.

For
  • Proportionate: the penalty fits the offense.
  • Dissuasive without being heavy-handed over a small mistake.
  • Distinguishes a minor oversight from deliberate concealment.
Against
  • Who judges the seriousness? Risk of arbitrariness.
  • Heavier to implement: it takes a body to decide.
③ Strong automatic sanctions
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Once a serious omission is proven, the penalty applies automatically: ineligibility for office, with no case-by-case discretion.

For
  • Highly dissuasive: the rule is clear-cut.
  • The same for everyone, with no subjective call by any body.
Against
  • Can punish an honest mistake the same as fraud.
  • Rigid: no room for nuance based on context.
None of these options is imposed: the choice will be settled by public debate, then by the referendum.
🌍 Elsewhere: 🇪🇺 the European Union keeps a public transparency register: European commissioners' meetings with interest representatives are published online.
✓
A vote everyone can cast — transparency plus individual accountability for each official; the only losers are those who vote in the shadows or hide their interests.

⚖️ Independent checks and balances

10

Genuinely independent watchdogs: public prosecutors AND ARCOM

The authorities meant to hold power to account must not be appointed by that power.

  • Public prosecutors: prosecutors are no longer appointed or instructed by the Minister of Justice. Appointments and discipline go through the High Council of the Judiciary (with binding approval); instructions in individual cases are prohibited.
  • ARCOM (France's media regulator): its members are no longer appointed by political powerholders (the President of the Republic, the presidents of the two chambers). A depoliticized appointment process, so it can enforce media impartiality without depending on those it oversees.
Problem solved
A justice system and a media referee too dependent on the executive → weakened impartiality (the Council of Europe / GRECO has flagged this for France's prosecutors).
Fine-tuning
⚙️
Open to debate: the exact depoliticized appointment process (qualified majority, peer co-optation, a mix) — to be aligned with the Constitutional Court (measure 11).

How do we appoint these authorities without making them dependent on those in power? The principle is fixed: public prosecutors and the media watchdog — France's media regulator (ARCOM) — must no longer be appointed by the very people they are supposed to keep in check. What remains is choosing how they are selected.

① A supermajority of Parliament
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Appointing these officials requires a broad share of the votes of members of parliament and senators (for example three-fifths).

For
  • Forces the majority and the opposition to agree: no one can install “their” candidate alone.
  • The person chosen carries real democratic legitimacy.
Against
  • Risk of deadlock if the sides can't reach an agreement.
  • It's still an appointment decided by politicians.
② Selection by peers
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Judges and prosecutors, or professionals in the sector, choose their own leadership themselves.

For
  • Genuine independence from politicians.
  • The competence of those chosen is assured.
Against
  • Risk of an insular circle and guild mentality (choosing among themselves).
  • Weak democratic legitimacy: citizens have no say.
③ A mixed panel
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Selection is shared between Parliament, peers, and civil society, possibly with a share chosen by lot.

For
  • Balances the different sources of legitimacy (political, professional, civic).
  • Keeps any single camp from locking everything down.
Against
  • A more complex system to organize.
  • Hard to decide who picks “civil society.”
④ A citizens' chamber selected by lot
In plain terms: citizens drawn by lot, like a jury, trained and supported by experts, who interview the candidates and decide.
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Citizens chosen by lot (like a trial jury), trained and supported by experts, interview the candidates and make the call.

For
  • Maximum independence: neither politicians nor guild interests — no one to owe a favor to.
  • Direct popular legitimacy: these are ordinary citizens.
  • Nearly impossible to capture or buy (the draw is regularly renewed).
Against
  • Do citizens chosen by lot have the expertise to assess these candidates? (Hence the training and the experts.)
  • A new mechanism, still little tested for this kind of appointment.
  • Takes time and real support.
None of these options is imposed: the choice will be settled by public debate, then confirmed by referendum.
🌍 Elsewhere: in 🇮🇹 Italy, prosecutors' careers are managed by a High Council mostly elected by the judiciary itself.
✓
A vote everyone can cast — a justice system AND a media referee standing above the parties protect every side in turn. (This also reinforces the safeguard in measure 11 and the fairness in measure 7.)
11

A true Constitutional Court, made up of jurists

In concrete terms: the Constitutional Council becomes a genuine Court composed solely of qualified jurists, serving long, non-renewable terms. No more purely political appointments, and no more former presidents sitting as members by right.

Problem solved
A “guardian of rights” perceived as political — and therefore not very credible.
Fine-tuning
⚙️
Open to debate: the exact appointment process (qualified parliamentary majority, peer co-optation, a mix).

Who sits on the Constitutional Court, and who appoints them? The principle is fixed: a Court of qualified jurists, serving long, non-renewable terms, without former presidents as members by right. What remains is choosing how its members are selected.

① Appointed by Parliament by supermajority
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Members of parliament and senators choose the judges, but only with a broad majority (for example three-fifths of the votes).

For
  • Democratic legitimacy: the judges are chosen by the people's representatives.
  • The supermajority forces consensus across party lines.
Against
  • The choice stays in the hands of politicians.
  • Risk of parties horse-trading the seats.
② Selected by the high courts
Open to debate the case for and against ›

The highest courts (Court of Cassation, Council of State, Court of Auditors) select the members, from among legal professionals, not politicians.

For
  • Guaranteed legal expertise: judges chosen by jurists.
  • Independence from political power.
Against
  • Risk of an insular circle of judges co-opting one another.
  • Weak democratic legitimacy: the people have no say.
③ A mixed panel
Open to debate the case for and against ›

Members come from three sources at once: Parliament, the high courts, and legal scholars.

For
  • Seeks a balance between legal expertise and legitimacy.
  • No single actor controls the composition.
Against
  • A more complex system to organize.
  • The mix between the three sources is tricky to set.
None of these options is favored here: the choice will be settled by public debate, then by the referendum.
🌍 Elsewhere: in 🇩🇪 Germany, the judges of the Karlsruhe Constitutional Court are elected by a two-thirds vote of Parliament, for non-renewable 12-year terms.
✓
A vote everyone can cast — constitutional justice standing above the parties benefits each of them, in turn.

♻️ Renewing power

12

Limit the number of terms — and set their length

In concrete terms: we cap the number of terms an official can serve over time, we limit the offices held at the same time, and the length of each term is itself put back on the table (keep the five-year presidential term or not, align MPs and senators or not…). No more lifelong political careers: turnover is guaranteed.

  • Members of the National Assembly — a term whose length is open to debate (5 years today), renewable a limited number of times (e.g., 2 or 3).
  • Senators — same logic, with the question of aligning their term with MPs' (their current 6-year term is longer).
  • President — on top of the existing two-consecutive-term limit, a cap over an entire career, with the term length (five years or otherwise) open to debate.
  • Holding several offices at once — also limit how many offices can be held simultaneously, extending the 2014 laws.
Problem solved
The careerism and disconnect of officials entrenched in power for too long, or wearing several hats at once.
Fine-tuning
⚙️
Open to debate: the exact numbers (how many terms, the length of each one, keep the five-year term or not), the rules on holding several offices at once, and the full list of offices covered.

How should terms in office be limited over time? The principle is fixed: an end to lifelong political careers, for all elected officials. What remains is choosing the exact shape of the limit.

① Limit consecutive terms
Open to debate the case for and against ›

You can serve 2 terms in a row, then a mandatory 4-year break before you can return. Example: a member of parliament could serve 10 straight years (2 × 5 years), then would have to step away for at least 4 years.

For
  • Forces regular turnover among officeholders.
  • Keeps the door open to returning after a break.
Against
  • An officeholder can “rotate out and back” indefinitely.
  • Turnover only happens in fits and starts.
② Limit the lifetime total
Open to debate the case for and against ›

3 terms maximum over a lifetime, period. Example: 3 terms as senator (18 years) or 2 terms as president — once the limit is reached, you pass the torch.

For
  • Guaranteed turnover among leaders.
  • Puts a clean end to politics as a career.
Against
  • Loses capable, experienced officeholders.
  • A rule seen as harsh and inflexible.
③ Limit by a maximum duration
Open to debate the case for and against ›

No one may spend more than 12 years in the same office. Example: at most 12 years as a member of parliament, 12 years as a senator, 10 years as president (two 5-year terms) — however the terms are strung together.

For
  • A rule that is simple and readable for everyone.
Against
  • The 12-year figure is still arbitrary.
  • Easy to sidestep by switching offices.
Related questions: the length of each term (keep the five-year presidential term or not, align senators’ terms with MPs’ or not); holding several offices at once (how far to extend the 2014 laws). The rule applies to all elected officials: MPs, senators, the president, and local executives. Settled by public debate, then by the referendum.
🌍 Elsewhere: in the 🇺🇸 United States, the president has been limited to 2 terms since 1951 (the 22nd Amendment); in 🇲🇽 Mexico, no presidential reelection has been the rule for a century.
✓
A vote everyone can cast — hugely popular; the only losers are officials who have held their seats for decades.

In summary

How the twelve fit together

All of them deal with the rules of the democratic game, not with policy choices: they don't say who should win, but how we vote, elect, inform, and hold power to account. The RIC is the heart of it — it gives the people the final say and will later make it possible to settle the divisive issues (taxes, immigration, Europe, energy) without any side imposing its answer. The other eleven make that power honest and reliable: a reformed voting system to end tactical voting and voting against, blank ballots that count, candidacies open to citizens and known 6 months in advance, a campaign freed from polls with regulated airtime, officials who account for every vote, an ineligibility rule that strikes at corruption without being open to abuse, and independent checks and balances (justice, media, a Constitutional Court).

An analytical, non-partisan document. Every measure is precise; only its fine-tuning is open to debate, then settled by referendum. Choices that could divide — such as the voting method — are presented with their arguments for and against, with no thumb on the scale. The case cited (measure 8) is reported attributively, without prejudging a closed matter.